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PAD 4603 - Test 1 - Cases

memorize.ai (lvl 286)

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Section 1

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Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)

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Mar 14, 2020

Cards (16)

Section 1

(16 cards)

Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)

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Facts: In response to an apparent increase use of cocaine among prenatal patients, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) began to order drugs screens. Those testing positive were referred for treatment. Subsequently, MUSC began a relationship with Charleston law enforcement, which led to a policy outlining legal action to be taken against pregnant addicts, including protocols for arrest, with the hope that the threat of the law would get women into treatment. No consent was given by the women for the drug screening. Issue: - Is a state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes an unreasonable search in violation of the 4th Amendment if the patient has not consented to the procedure? Decision: 6 votes for Ferguson, 3 vote(s) against. - Yes. Using the "special needs" test, the court noted that "in this case . . . the central and indispensable feature of the policy, from its inception, was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment." Further, the policy did not "discuss different courses of medical treatment for either mother or infant." The involvement of law-enforcement officials throughout the development of the policy showed that the ultimate interest was "crime control."

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McKnight v. South Carolina, 378 S.C. 33 (2008)

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Facts: Regina McKnight, an African-American, pregnant woman gave birth to a stillborn child. Examinations showed no natural causes of death, however, the medical staff was aware McKnight was a drug addict. Upon further testing, the stillborn tested positive for metabolites of cocaine. Without further inquiry or evidence, doctors attributed her cocaine use as the cause of the child's death. She was prosecuted on that grounds and convicted of homicide and sentenced to 12 years in prison without parole, even after numerous appeals and repeated reasoning that the statute for homicide by child abuse should not apply to pregnant women without intention to harm the child. McKnight and her attorneys appealed to the US Supreme Court, but that body declined to review the decision Later: In 2008, after remaining in prison for 8 years, the state Supreme Court focused on whether McKnight got a fair trial. It found that she did not. McKnight's trial counsel, an overworked public defender, was "ineffective in her preparation of McKnight's defense through expert testimony and cross-examination," the court found. The court also found that the information given to the jury about the supposed link between McKnight's cocaine use and her stillbirth was not scientifically supported.

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Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790 (1872)

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Facts: Convicted inmate murders a Corrections Officer during an escape attempt while working at a public railroad. It is decided that he will be hanged. Inmate appeals case on grounds that venue (CO's home jurisdiction) contained too much bias for a fair trial. Decision: - Denied. Since he is a ward of the prison, no matter where the crime took place, the trial will be held in the city the prison is located. He is a slave of the state, without rights. Exemplified "Hands-Off Doctrine".

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Greenholtz v. Inmates of NE Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)

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Facts: Inmates at the Nebraska prison who had been denied parole brought a class action lawsuit against the parole board, claiming they had been denied procedural due process. Under NE law, once an inmate becomes eligible for discretionary parole, a two-stage hearing is held, with various rights being granted to the inmate. Despite the rights, the inmates still claimed that they were being denied the same due process rights given to parolees prior to parole revocation, as given in Morrissey v. Brewer. Issues: - Does the due process clause of the 14th Amendment apply to discretionary parole release determinations made by the NE parole board? - If NE inmates are not entitled to due process under the Constitution prior to discretionary parole release determinations, are they nonetheless entitled to due process because of the way the NE law is worded? - If yes, did the NE law provide for sufficient due process rights? Decisions: 5-4 votes for Greenholtz/NE Parole Board. - No, the mere possibility of discretionary parole release does not carry with it due process rights under the Constitution, therefore, inmates are not entitled to due process rights. - Yes, in the case of NE Inmates, however, they are entitled to due process rights not because of the Constitution, but because the NE statute is worded to create a "liberty interest" that entitles inmates to due process. - The rights given to inmates by the NE statute, however, indeed satisfy the due process rights of the Constitution, thus inmates were afforded proper due process under NE law.

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Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

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Facts: Marbury and several others were appointed to government posts created by Congress in the last days of John Adams's presidency. Federalist, William Marbury, was appointed justice of the peace in the D.C., but his and the other appointees' commissions were not fully finalized by the end of Adams's term. Disgruntled, Marbury and the appointees invoked an act of Congress and sued for their jobs in the SC. They demanded that the current SC utilize original jurisdiction highlighted in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and issue a Writ of Mandamus to new Secretary of State, Madison, to deliver the commissions. Issues: - Does Marbury have a right to the commission? - Does the law grant Marbury a remedy? - Does the SC have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void? - Can Congress expand the scope of the SC's original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution? - Does the SC have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus? Decision: 4 votes for Madison, 0 vote(s) against: - Yes. Marbury has right to the commission. - Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. - Yes. The SC has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void. - No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the SC's original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution. - No. The SC does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. Marbury and other appointees never received their commissions and, therefore, never took office. This case establishes the SC's power of judicial review.

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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)

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Facts: Responding to a reported weapons disturbance phoned by jealous acquaintance Eubanks, Houston police entered Lawrence's apartment and saw him and Garner, engaging in a private, consensual homosexual act. Both were arrested and convicted of "deviate sexual intercourse" in violation of a Texas ("Homosexual Conduct") statute forbidding two persons of same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. After numerous rulings and appeals, the Texas 14th Court of Appeals heard the case and affirmed that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick controlling. The SC granted certiorari. Issues: - Does a state statute outlawing homosexual sex violate the due process clause of the 14th Amendment? - Does the state statute which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples violate the 14th Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws? - Are the petitioners' vital interests in liberty and privacy violated? - Should Bowers v. Hardwick should be overruled? Decision: 6-3 in favor of striking down the Texas statute. - Yes, intimate sexual conduct, between consenting adults, is a liberty protected under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. - O'Connor concurred yes, it violated equal protection guarantees. - Yes, Bowers v. Hardwick should be overruled and similar sodomy statutes in 13 other states should be implicitly invalidated. The court held that the private activity in one's one home in general is a right; and the relevant law furthers no legitimate state interest in limiting such activity.

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Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)

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Facts: John Kelly, acting on behalf of New York residents receiving financial assistance either under the federally-assisted program for Families with Dependent Children or under New York State's home relief program, challenged the constitutionality of procedures for notice and termination of such aid. Although originally offering no official notice or opportunity for hearings to those whose aid was scheduled for termination, the State of New York implemented a hearing procedure after commencement of Kelly's litigation. Issue: - Does a State that terminates public assistance benefits to a particular recipient without affording him an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination deny the recipient due process of law? Decision: 5-3 in favor of Kelly. - Yes, the Court held that states must afford public aid recipients a pre-termination evidentiary hearing before discontinuing their aid. The Court weighed welfare recipients' need for procedural due process against the competing considerations of the possible harm they might suffer from discontinuation and the government's interest in the monetary gain from their removal. The Court concluded that state interests in conserving administrative costs are not sufficient to override public aid recipients' interest in procedural due process. With respect to New York's newly implemented hearings, the Court found them deficient insofar as they did not permit recipients to present evidence, be heard orally in person or through counsel, or cross-examine adverse witnesses.

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Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)

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Facts: Morrissey and Booher were both paroled from Iowa state prisons. Each subsequently had his parole revoked because of violations of parole conditions, and each sued, challenging the revocation procedures. One principal line of attack was that the absence of a revocation hearing violated due process. Issue: - Do the requirements of due process apply to parole revocations? Decision: - Yes. The SC first identified "that the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss.'" Thus, the Court devised an "informal hearing" structure, requiring the following: --- the parolee be given written notice specifying the alleged violation; --- evidence of the violation be disclosed; --- a neutral and detached body constitute the hearing authority; --- the parolee have the chance to appear and offer a defense, including testimony, documents, and witnesses; --- the parolee have the right to cross-examine witnesses; --- and a written statement be provided to the parolee at the conclusion of the hearing that includes the hearing body's decision, the testimony considered, and reasons for revoking parole, if such occurs.

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Tarasoff v. California, 17 Cal.3d 425 (1976)

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Facts: In October 1969, Prosenjit Poddar murdered Tatiana Tarasoff. Plaintiffs, Tatiana's parents, contended that only a short time prior, Poddar had expressed his intention to murder her. This, they alleged, he had confided to his therapist, Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist employed by University of California. They further alleged that Moore had warned campus police of Poddar's intentions, and that the police had briefly detained him, but then released him. Two grounds were asserted for their action: the failure to confine Poddar, in spite of his expressed intentions to kill Tarasoff, and failure to warn Tarasoff or her parents. Defendants maintained that they owed no duty of care to the victim, and were immune from suit. Issue: - Did Defendants owe a duty to the victim thus making them liable for the harm that ensued? Decision: 4-2 in favor of Tarasoff parents. - Yes, a psychologist has a duty to warn those who might be in danger at the hands of his patients. Such a relationship between doctor and patient establishes a duty to inform a third party about the prospects of being killed. Usually it's a duty owed when the doctor knows both of the people. The risk of unnecessary warnings given is a reasonable price to pay for lives of possible victims that may be saved. The containment of such risks goes against the greater public good. The exercise of reasonable care to protect an intended victim requires the therapist to warn the endangered part or those who can reasonably be expected to notify him. There exists no societal interest that would protect against such information.

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Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)

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Facts: Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in consensual homosexual sodomy in the bedroom of his home. Charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the its constitutionality in Federal District Court on the basis of violating the Equality Clause of the 14th Amendment. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim, the court dismissed the case. On Hardwick's appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Georgia's Attorney General, Michael J. Bowers, appealed to the SC and was granted certiorari. Issue: - Does the Constitution confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy, thereby invalidating the laws of many states which make such conduct illegal? Decision: 5 votes for Bowers/Georgia, 4 vote(s) against. - No. The Court found that there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy; states could outlaw those practices. Justice Byron White argued that the Court has acted to protect rights not easily identifiable in the Constitution only when those rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or when they are "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition". The right to commit sodomy did not meet either of these standards. White feared guaranteeing a right to sodomy would be the product of "judge-made constitutional law" and send the Court down the road of illegitimacy. This ruling was later overturned by Lawrence v. Texas in 2003.

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Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)

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Facts: The Massachusetts legislature passed a law allowing the distribution of contraceptives only to married people with a doctor's prescription. William Baird was charged for lecturing on the topic, but this was overturned by the MA Supreme Judicial Court as a violation of the 1st Amendment. Baird was also charged and convicted under this law for giving vaginal contraceptive foam to a 19 year old unmarried Boston University student at the end of his lecture on population control. He filed suit claiming his conviction was unconstitutional. Issue: - Did the Massachusetts law violate the right to privacy acknowledged in Griswold v. Connecticut and protected from state intrusion by the 14th Amendment? Decision: 6-1 in favor of Baird. - The SC ruled that it was unconstitutional to treat married and unmarried people differently regarding contraception. It said the right to privacy belongs not to the married couple but to the individual person, and prevents government interference with "matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."

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Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)

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Facts: Inmate of Nebraska state prison, Wolff, alleged that disciplinary proceedings violated Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, and objected to inspection of privileged mail between inmates and attorneys. District court rejected disciplinary proceedings claims, but held that mail inspection violated prisoners' rights. U.S. Court of Appeals of 8th Circuit later reversed disciplinary proceedings claims, holding that prisons should use same procedures used in probation and parole hearings, and affirmed inspection of mail. Issue: - Do the disciplinary proceedings at Nebraska prison violate Due Process Clause? Decision: - 6-3, yes. While prisoners are not entitled to full due process protections, disciplinary proceedings must include written notice of charges, written statement of evidence, and opportunity for inmate to call witnesses/present evidence, this right being denied only if deemed hazardous to institutional safety. Also held that prison's opening of privileged letters in presence of inmates was not unconstitutional. It is now settled law that "hands-off" ends where the infringement of constitutional rights begins.

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Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 248 N.Y. 339 (1928)

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Facts: Helen Palsgraf was standing on a railroad platform purchasing a ticket, when a train stopped and two men ran to catch it. One of the men nearly fell, and two railroad employees attempted to help him board. In the process, a package containing fireworks fell and the contents exploded. As a result of the explosion, scales at the other end of the platform fell and struck Palsgraf. She sued, claiming negligence, and a jury found in her favor. Long Island Railroad appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. Issues: - How is the duty of due care that is owed determined? - To whom does a party owe the duty of due care? Decision: 4-3; The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the appellate court judgment and dismissed the complaint. The conduct of the guards was wrongful, but not in relation to Palsgraf. No one could have foreseen her being injured for she was located outside the zone of danger. Palsgraf was ordered to pay the railroad's legal expenses, but they never sought them. - To find negligence there must first be a finding that a duty was owed and breached, and that the injury could have been avoided if the defendant had been following that duty. The orbit of the danger or risk associated with a danger or risk is that which a reasonable person would foresee. The Palsgraf case established foreseeability as the test for proximate cause.

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Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967)

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Facts: Mempa pled guilty for "joyriding" and was sentenced to two years probation on the condition that he spend 30 days in jail and the sentence be deferred. Four months later, the Spokane County prosecutor moved to have his probation revoked on the grounds that he had been involved in a burglary during his probation. At the subsequent hearing, Mempha was unrepresented by counsel. He admitted to the burglary, which was confirmed by his probation officer. The petitioner's probation was revoked. Issue: - Does the right to counsel extend to the time of sentencing where the sentencing has been deferred subject to probation? Decision: 9-0 in favor of Mempa. - Yes. The 6th Amendment, as applied through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, requires that counsel be afforded to a felony defendant in a post-trial proceeding for revocation of his probation and imposition of deferred sentencing. The presence and services of counsel at the deferred sentencing stage are necessary to ensure that certain rights, such as that of appeal, are suitably asserted to the circumstance, and to afford the defendant the substantial assistance which may be necessary in various other situations at that stage.

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Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)

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Facts: The Supreme Court ruled that a state's ban on the use of contraceptives violated the right to marital privacy. The case concerned a Connecticut law that criminalized the encouragement or use of all types of birth control.Estelle Griswold, the executive director of Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Dr. C. Lee Buxton, doctor and professor at Yale Medical School, were arrested and found guilty as accessories to providing illegal contraception. They were fined $100 each, however, they appealed to the Supreme Court of Errors of CT, claiming the law violated the U.S. Constitution. The CT court upheld the conviction, and the two appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which opted to review the case in 1965. Issue: - Under constitutional law, does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives? Decision: 7-2, in favor of Griswold. - Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that the law violated the "right to marital privacy" and could not be enforced against married people. It contended that the Bill of Rights specific guarantees have "penumbras" (rights guaranteed by implication in a constitution or the implied powers of a rule), created by "emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and opinion." In other words, the "spirit" of the First Amendment (free speech), Third Amendment (prohibition on the forced quartering of troops), Fourth Amendment (freedom from searches and seizures), Fifth Amendment (freedom from self-incrimination), and Ninth Amendment (other rights), as applied against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, creates a general "right to privacy" that cannot be unduly infringed. Further, this right to privacy is "fundamental" when it concerns the actions of married couples, because it "is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions." Because a married couple's use of contraception constitutes a "fundamental" right, CT must prove to the Court that its law is "compelling" and "absolutely necessary" to overcome that right. Since CT failed to prove this, the law was struck down as applied.

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Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)

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Facts: IRS revoking tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory institutions - Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. Schools contended that this violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. Issue: - Can the government prohibit race discrimination at the expense of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clauses? Decision: 8-1 in favor of the US/IRS. - Revocation of tax-exempt status for religious practices which violate the advancement of "public policy" under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.

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